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this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
HOWELLS, INC. V. NELSON DOES NOT CONTROL. 
McShane relied in the lower court and relies in this 
Court on Howellsy Inc. v. Nelsonf 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah, 
1977) as controlling. Howells was decided prior to the 
enactment of the current Utah Bad Check Statute. The old 
law was repealed and the current law enacted in 1981. A 
copy of the repealed statute is contained in the Addendum 
to this Brief. The statute which Howells interpreted was 
a fraud statute. That statute invoked liability upon "any 
person who willfully, with intent to defraud, makes ... 
any check ... ." Howells turned upon the absence of 
required elements of fraud. The court determined, 
... the Plaintiff was not induced to give 
anything of value, nor was it in any way cheated 
or adversely effected by the giving of the 
check. Id^ at 1149. 
Inducement is an element of Common Law Fraud in Utah. See 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141 247 P.2d 273 (1952). 
The court further held that because the plaintiff in 
Howells had specifically agreed to take a post-dated 
check, the instrument did not come within the definition 
of a check. It was therefore not covered by the then 
existing fraudulent check statute. 
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Check Statute in light of provisions of the Uniform 
Commercial Code which would otherwise control (Utah Code 
Annotated 70A-3-403 (1953, as amended 1965)). It 
concludes that the Utah Bad Check Statute should be 
amended. It does not conclude that this amendment should 
be by judicial fiat. If the Statute is to be amended/ the 
appropriate method of amendment would be by the 
Legislature/ who created it in the first place. 
The clear public policy behind the current Utah Bad 
Check Statute is to transfer the burden for bad corporate 
checks from the holder of the check to the person who 
issued the check/ regardless of his status as a corporate 
officer or otherwise. Had the Legislature wished to allow 
the defenses available under the previous Utah Bad Check 
Statute or under the Uniform Commercial Codef it could 
easily have done so. The Legislature obviously did not 
wish to allow these defenses because of the broad scope of 
documents which are made subject to the Statute/ and 
because of the simple manner in which liability is 
invoked. 
The Utah Bad Check Statute is a strict liability 
statute which was drafted by the Legislature for an 
obvious business purpose/ and which should not be amended/ 
nor defeated/ by this Court. 
-4-
II. 
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UNCONSTITUTIONALITY FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL. 
McSfia;.*. aivjaeo «; l * n * - u ; r Yr 3 Brief t h a t th~- " t s ! 
Bad Che:-H S t a t u t e ^ : ; r o r s t i t u ^ n > a! i *->h: - : - r : e s 
1: ii 
b r i e f r e c o t o n . i i ca t e : . t ha t r . F was 
this* * - - •*- r a i s e i a? a d e f ^ n r e t o n d i " 1 ' . Muiiuii i u i 
Issues not presented •:• * -- ~;+ i*r 
decision are not reviewable by this Court . 
Trayner v. Cashing, 688 P.^l ?Sfi. p~7 rr+. , 
1984). 
Tl I :' ' • c >n 
appea. ... ^ COK^L iui ioua; i.-.sut ui vt rn : nece.: .:ar_y 
vitiate this : u i - -: review. 
1 S S U C . \ i. u J. c c: o : i ^  ;. ; a .. \ U ~ * - ICli-'L'w 
appeal, This genexal rule apples equallv tu 
constitutional issues-/ with the linite:1 
exception of where a person's 1ibe::,y u jt 
stake. Pratt v. City Council _ i Ji;y o f 
Riverton
 r 639 P. 2d 172, 173-174 rift ah, 1981). 
The provisior <•:. • • -•: onstitution McShane ie: . • . .*.n 
i "„• A i I. I . : . : <. - . . ^ S , 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty ^ v 
property, wi thoi it due pi oc-r;- ••:' . a * * 
Despite the fact, that McShane refers, in his Brief, to his 
l o s s a s a l o s s o f I ilnMirt ,' ill IMI r U\ ; : H f h a t I h • iluilcjnient 
subjects hun to a loss of property- Even \ f the Utah Bad 
-5-
Check Statute were unconstitutional/ arguendo/ he may not 
raise that issue at this late date. 
III. 
THE UTAH BAD CHECK STATUTE IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Without waiving his primary defense to McShane's 
constitutionality argument shown in the preceeding 
section/ Haig specifically shows that the Utah Bad Check 
Statute is not unconstitutional. 
Article 1 Section 7 of the Utah Constitution 
provides/ 
No person shall be deprived of lifef liberty or 
property/ without due process of law. 
The operative language of this Section of the Utah 
Constitution is identical to the operative language of 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution 
of the United States. Cases interpreting the Fourteenth 
Amendment should therefore be instructive of this 
language. 
In Parratt v. Taylor/ 451 U.S. 527f 68 L.Ed. 2d 420f 
101 S.Ct. 1908 (1981)/ the Supreme Court discussed the due 
process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Nothing in that Amendment protects against all 
deprivations of lifef liberty or property by the 
State. The Fourteenth Amendment protects only 
against deprivations "without due process of 
law." Id. at 68 L.Ed. 2d 430. 
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In Parratt, the Supreme Court reviewed many of its due 
process decisions for the twenty-one years preceding the 
decision. 
In some cases, this Court has held that due 
process requires a pre-deprivation hearing 
before the State interferes with any liberty or 
property interest enjoyed by its citizens. In 
most of these cases, however, the deprivation of 
property was pursuant to some established State 
procedure and "process" could be offered before 
any actual deprivation took place. Id. 
The gravamen of all of these cases was that a hearing was 
required. 
In all these cases, deprivations of property 
were authorized by an established State 
procedure and due process was held to require 
predeprivation notice and hearing in order to 
serve as a check on the possibility that a 
wrongful deprivation would occur. Id. 
All that is required is a hearing. Article 1 Section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution was previously so interpreted; see 
Jensen v. Union Pacific Railway Company, 6 Utah 253, 21 
Pacific 994 (1889). McShane had his hearing at the time 
the court awarded summary judgment. 
McShane confuses due process with a supposed right to 
present defenses which the Statute has removed. McShane 
had his day in court. He had the opportunity to establish 
any defenses which remain, following the Legislature's 
implementation of strict liability in this matter. He 
could have presented numerous defenses which would have 
-7-
not been removed by the new Statute, had those defenses 
been factually available to him. Had he alleged and shown 
by affidavit that he did not sign the check or that he 
signed the check under duress, those defenses would 
certainly have avoided summary judgment. No such defenses 
were factually available. The Legislature's removal of 
defenses which existed prior to the repealing of the 
former Statute does not rise to level of 
unconstitutionality. 
IV. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WAS NOT OPPOSED BY A PROPER AFFIDAVIT. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires, 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
McShane refers, both in his Brief in this Court and in his 
Memorandum in the lower court, to a conversation 
supposedly had between Haig and the Third-Party Defendant, 
Ronald Davey, whereby Haig acknowledged that there was no 
money in the account or that the check would be held for 
an unspecified period of time before being negotiated. 
The record is notably devoid of any affidavit from any 
person testifying to this alleged conversation. Rule 
-8-
56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleadings, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
Rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Even if the alleged conversation between Haig and Davey 
had taken place and was material, McShane's failure to 
properly present it through affidavits in the lower court 
makes the summary judgment in the lower court well-taken. 
Parenthetically, Haig notes that such an affidavit 
should not have avoided summary judgment because of the 
arguments made in section one of this Brief. 
V. 
HAIG IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE LOWER 
COURT, AS WELL AS ON APPEAL. 
The lower court granted summary judgment on Haig's 
Bad Check claim, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 7-15-1 
(1953, as amended 1981). Utah Code Annotated 7-15-1(3) 
(1953, as amended 1981) provides for the payment of 
attorney's fees by persons in McShane's position. Fees 
were properly awarded below. 
Similarly, because of the statute authorizing 
attorney's fees to Haig, he is entitled to recover those 
attorney's fees reasonably expended in defending this 
appeal; see Christensen v. Abbott, 671 P.2d 121 (Utah, 
-9-
1983). 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the lower court was legally correct, 
and the appeal should be dismissed. 
DATED this | ItiP^ day of October, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COOK & WILDE, P.C. 
ROBERT W WILDE 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the of October, 
1986f four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were deposited in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following: 
DONN E. CASSITY 
ROMNEYf NELSON & CASSITY 
Atttorneys for Appellant 
136 East South Temple, #900 
University Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM! 
FRAUDULENT CHECKS 7-15-1 
7-14-3. Immunity from liability.—Any commercial, national, or state 
bank making any report or communication of information authorized by 
this act sliall not be liable to any person for disclosing such information to 
any recipient authorized under the provisions of this act, or for any error 
or omission in such report or communication. 
History: L. 1967, ch. 15, §3 . 
7-14-4. Reciprocal exchange of information authorized.—One or more 
commercial, national, or state banks may jointly agree with one or more 
other banks or other financial institutions for the reciprocal exchange of 
any information authorized to be reported by the provisions of this act. 
Such reciprocal exchange of information or the acts or refusals to act of 
one or more recipients because of such information shall not constitute 
a boycott or blacklist, or otherwise be a basis for liability to any person 
on the part of any participant in the reciprocal exchange of information 
authorized by this act. 
History: L. 1967, ch. 15, §4 . 
7-14-5. "Financial institution" and "credit reporting agency" defined.— 
As used in this act: 
(1) the term "financial institution'' means any institution subject to 
the supervision of the state banking department; 
(2) the term "credit reporting agency" shall include any co-operative 
credit reporting agency maintained by an association of financial institu-
tions or one or more associations of merchants. 
History: L. 1967, ch. 15, § 5 . 
CHAPTER 15 
FRAUDULENT CHECKS 
Sfrtion 7-1 .">-1. Drawing or isMiing ngainst nonexistent account or inswfnVient funds 
—Intent to defraud—Civil liuldity—Damages. 
7-15-2. Civil action—Evidence of intent . 
7-15-3. Notice of nonpayment or dishonor—When presumed. 
7-15-1. Drawing or issuing" against nonexistent account or insufficient 
funds—Intent to defraud—Civil liability—Damages.—(1) Any person who 
willfully, with intent to defraud makes, draws or issues any cheek, draft 
or order upon any bank, banking association or other depositary for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership or corporation any 
money, merchandise, property or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary or rent, which check, draft or order is not honored 
upon presentment because the maker, drawer or issuer does not have 
the account with the depositary upon which the check, draft or order 
has been made or drawn, or does not have sufficient funds in such account 
or sufficient credit with such depositary for payment of the check, draft 
or order in full, sliall be liable to the holder of the cheek, draft or order in 
acivil action as provided in this section. 
519 
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(2) Tn such civil action the person making, drawing or issuing the 
check, draft or order shall he liable to the holder of it for the amount 
thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including all court costs 
and reasonable attorney's fees. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 240, § 1. CoUateral References. 
Title of Act Overdrafts, 10 Am. Jur . 2d 625, Banks 
§ G55. 
An act relat ing to chocks, d r i f t s or 
orders issued against nonexistent account Postdated chocks, construction and ef-
or in.siiflic-.iont funds; provi.lmg for civil
 t V ( , t o f i, | i ; i(, ,.n<M.k» statute with respect 
liability to the holder and for damages in j 0 o() ^ j ^ JJ o«l j 181. 
actions l>ased on this l iabil i ty; and pro- Pre-existing debt, construction and ef-
viding for presumptions regarding willful-
 f o c t o f « h a i l Ohock'' s ta tute with respect 
ness and intent and for notice.
 t o c h e e k i n p . l v m P I l t of, Z9 A. L. K. 2J 
Cross-Reference. Uo!>. 
Change of name of s tate banking de- Law Review, 
partment and bank commissioner to de- Criminal and Civil Liabili ty for Bad 
partmont of financial institutions and checks in Ctah, l!>7o T'tah L. Rev. 122. 
commissioner of financial insti tutions, 7-
1-1.1, 7-1-1.2. 
7-15-2. Civil action—Evidence of intent.—Tn any such civil action any 
of the following shall be prima facie evidence that the person making, 
drawing or issuing the cheek, draft or order did so willfully with an in-
tention to defraud : 
(1) Proof that at the time of issuance, the maker, drawer or issuer 
did not have the account with the depositary upon which the cheek, draft 
or order was made or drawn or did not have sufficient funds in his 
account or credit with the depositary for payment in full of the check, 
draft or order, and that he failed within ten days after receiving notice 
of nonpayment or dishonor to pay the check, draft or order; or 
(2) Proof that when presentment was made within a reasonable time, 
the maker, drawer or issuer did not have the account with the depositary 
upon which the cheek, draft or order was drawn or made or did not 
have sufficient funds in such account or credit with such depositary for 
payment in full of the check, draft or order, and that he failed within 
ten days after receiving notice of nonpayment or dishonor to pay the 
check, draft or order. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 240, §2 . 
7-15-3. Notice of nonpayment or dishonor—When presumed.—"Notice" 
as used in this act means notice given to the maker, drawer or issuer 
of the check, draft or order, either in person or in writing. Such notice 
in writing shall be conclusively presumed to have been given when properly 
deposited in the United States mails, postage prepaid, by certified or 
registered mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to such maker, 
drawer or issuer at his address as it appears on the check, draft or order 
or at his last-known address. 
History: L. 1969, ch. 240, § 3. 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Liability of Agents on 
Corporate Checks: 
The Conflicting Coverage of 
the Uniform Commercial 
Code and the Bad-Check 
Remedy Statute 
By Eric G. Jorgenson 
Eric G. Jorgenson received his J.D. degree from the J. Reuben 
Clark Law School at Brigham Young University. He is a member 
of the Nevada and Washington State Bars and is currently an 
associate with Sitter, Mayer and Mancuso, Ltd. in Las Vegas, 
Nevada. 
Corporations conduct many business 
transactions requiring the use of negoti-
able instruments. These instruments 
must be signed on the corporation's be-
half by an authorized agent. In most 
transactions involving a corporate 
check, the parties intend that only the 
corporation be bound by the instrument. 
Nevertheless, when a corporate check 
is dishonored a question of liability 
arises. Who should be held liable — the 
corporation, the agent, or both? Two 
Utah statutes address this question: 
UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-3-403 (1965) 
(the Uniform Commercial Code) and 
UTAH CODE ANN. §7-15-1 (1981) (the 
Bad-Check Remedy Statute). This arti-
cle will discuss the operation and effect 
of these statutes and reveal the greater 
burden of liability placed on corporate 
agents1 by the Bad-Check Remedy Sta-
tute regardless of the agent's satisfac-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code 
1
 Although the scope of this article specifically 
deals with the agency relationship in the corporate 
setting, Article Three of the Uniform Commercial 
Code and the principles set forth in this article are 
applicable to any agency relationship. 
requirements which free the agent from 
personal liability. 
I. The Uniform Commercial Code 
Article Three of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code establishes a set of rules to 
determine the liability of signers of 
corporate instruments. The general rule 
for liability on a negotiable instrument is 
that "[n]o person is liable on an instru-
ment unless his signature appears 
thereon."2 
The general rule regarding agent 
liability on commercial paper is that an 
agent is not liable if the principal's name 
and the agency relationship appear on 
the instrument. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §342(2) on 
"Negotiable Instruments" provides: 
An agent is not liable as a party to a 
negotiable instrument on which the 
name of the principal appears as if it 
is interpreted as being executed by 
the agent only on behalf of such prin-
cipal and if the agent has power to 
bind the principal. 
2UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-3-401(1) (1965). 
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This rule was adopted by UTAH CODE 
ANN. §70A-3-403 (1965)3 (hereinafter 
"70A-3-403"). Thus, on a dishonored 
corporate check the corporation is liable 
while the authorized agent avoids per-
sonal liability provided the following 
70A-3-403 requirements are met: (1) the 
agent names the corporation on the in-
strument and (2) the agent demons-
trates his agency relationship. The re-
mainder of the discussion of 70A-3-403' 
will deal with the personal liability of 
corporate agents. 
The corporate agent who signs a 
corporate check without naming the cor-
poration or disclosing his agency rela-
tionship will be personally liable on the 
instrument and is precluded from intro-
ducing parol evidence to deny liability. 
70A-3-403(2)(a) provides: 
An authorized representative who 
signs his own name to an instrument 
(a) is personally obligated if the in-
strument neither names the person 
represented nor shows that the repre-
sentative signed in a representative 
capacity. 
3UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-3-403 (1965) pro-
vides: 
(1) A signature may be made by an agent or 
other representative, and his authority to make it 
may be established as in other cases of repre-
sentation. No particular form of appointment is 
necessary to establish such authority. 
(2) An authorized representative who signs his 
own name to an instrument 
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument 
neither names the person represented nor shows 
that the representative signed in a representative 
capacity; 
(b) except as otherwise established between 
the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the 
instrument names the person represented but 
does not show that the representative signed in a 
representative capacity, or if the instrument does 
not name the person represented but does show 
that the representative signed in a representative 
capacity. 
(3) Except as otherwise established the name of 
an organization preceded or followed by the name 
and office of an authorized individual is a signature 
made in a representative capacity. 
In the Utah case of Sterling Press v. 
Pettit,4 a printing firm sued two corpo-
rate officers of a magazine publishing 
business.*The plaintiff received a check 
for services rendered to the business 
drawn on the corporate account and 
signed by the defendants. The defen-
dants failed to designate their agency 
relationship on the check. The check 
was dishonored and returned to the 
" plaintiff marked return to maker. The de-
fendants argued that they should not be 
personally liable because the plaintiff 
should have know he was dealing with a 
corporation. This argument was based 
on two grounds: first, the initial checks in 
payment for the printing were drawn on 
a corporate account; and second, furth-
er investigation by the plaintiff into mail-
ing permits and bank accounts would 
have shown that a corporation stood be-
hind the magazine. The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected these arguments and 
stated that 4,70A-3-403 requires that an 
agent or representative must show he 
actually is representing someone. 
Where the instrument neither names the 
entity represented nor shows the repre-
sentative capacity, the person who 
signed is personally obligated."5 
U.C.C. §3-403 problems most fre-
quently involve instruments which name 
the corporate entity but fail to disclose 
the agency relationship.6 70A-3-
403(2)(b), which applies to this situation, 
provides: 
(2) An authorized representative 
who signs his own name to an instru-
ment. . . 
4580 P.2d 599 (Utah 1978). 
5Id. at 600. 
6
 Holland, Corporate Officers Beware — Your 
Signature on a Negotiable Instrument May Be 
Hazardous to Your Economic Health, 13 IND. L. 
REV. 893, 904 (1980). 
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(b) except as otherwise established 
between the immediate parties, is 
personally obligated if the instrument 
names the person represented but 
does not show that the representative 
signed in a representative capacity, 
or if the instrument does not name 
the person represented but does 
show that the representative signed 
in a representative capacity. 
The characterization of the holder of the 
instrument is critical to the determination 
of the agent's liability. If the holder is an 
immediate party to the instrument (the 
payee of the check), the agent and the 
corporation may introduce parol evi-
dence to demonstrate that the agent 
was not intended to be held liable. If the 
holder of the instrument is a third party 
transferee, parol evidence is not permit-
ted and the agent will be personally li-
able on the instrument. 
In Highfield v. Lang,7 the plaintiff, an 
employee of Orbit Postal Systems, 
brought action against Orbit's vice-
president who had signed the plaintiff's 
dishonored payroll check. The corporate 
name appeared on the check but the 
defendant failed to designate her repre-
sentative capacity. Since the plaintiff 
was the payee of the check, the court 
allowed the defendant to produce parol 
evidence indicating that the plaintiff 
knew he was being paid by the corpora-
tion and the defendant was acting-mere-
ly as an agent. Consequently, the court 
held that the defendant was not perso-
nally liable. 
When the corporate name is printed 
on the check but the signature on the 
instrument does not specifically include 
the corporate name or show the agency 
relationship, there is some dispute as to 
7394 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. App. 1979). 
whether U.C.C. §3-403(2)(a) or U.C.C. 
§3-403(2)(b) applies. In American Ex-
change Bank v. Cessna* the Oklahoma 
Federal District Court applied U.C.C. §3-
403(2)(b). The defendant signed the 
corporate check without indicating his 
representative capacity, but the name of 
the corporation appeared in the left-
hand corner along with a corporate 
address and telephone number. Since 
the plaintiff was a third party transferee, 
the defendant was not allowed to intro-
duce parol evidence to show his agency 
relationship. Thus, the court held for the 
plaintiff.9 In a case with a similar fact 
pattern,10 the Georgia Supreme Court 
applied U.C.C. §3-403(2)(a) and found 
the corporate agent liable.11 
70A-3-403(2)(b) also applies to the 
situation where the agent clearly de-
monstrates his agency relationship but 
fails to name the corporation.12 Thus, 
the agent will be precluded from using 
parol evidence and will be personally 
obligated to pay the dishonored corpo-
rate check if the holder of the check is a 
third party transferee. The agent may 
8386 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Okl. 1974). 
9See also, Poilin v. Mindy Mfg. Co., 211 Pa. 
Super. 87, 236 A.2d 542 (1967). The court held 
that defendant's signature was in a representative 
capacity where no capacity was specifically desig-
nated, but the check was designated a payroll 
check and the corporation's name appeared at top 
and in maker's position, above lines for manual 
signature. 
10Southern Oxygen Supply Co. v. Golian, 230 
Ga. 405, 197 S.E. 2d 374 (1973). 
11
 See also, Griffin v. Eilmger, 538 S.W.2d 97 
(Tex. 1976). 
12See Holland, Corporate Officers Beware — 
Your Signature on a Negotiable Instrument May be 
Hazardous to Your Economic Health, 13 IND. L 
REV. 893, 904 n. 55 (1980), where Mr. Holland 
states that "[rjesearch has revealed two cases 
which the representative capacity but not the 
corporate identity was shown." The two cases are: 
Giacalone v. Bernstein, 348 So.2d 679 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1977) and National Bank of Georgia v. 
Ament, 127 Ga. App. 838, 195 S.E.2d 202 (1973). 
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introduce parol evidence only if the hol-
der is the payee of the check. 
Where the name of the corporation is 
preceded or followed by the authorized 
signature which shows the agency rela-
tionship, the corporation is usually the 
only entity bound by the instrument. 
70A-3-403(3) provides: 
Except as otherwise established the 
name of an organization preceded or 
followed by the name and office of an 
authorized individual is a signature 
made in a representative capacity. 
The exception under 70A-3-403(3) to 
the general rule of corporate liability 
allows the holder of a dishonored instru-
ment to use parol evidence to establish 
the agent's personal liability by demon-
strating that the intent of the parties was 
to bind both the agent and the 
corporation.13 Nevertheless, courts 
generally have denied the use of parol 
evidence if the instrument is 
unambiguous.14 
In summary, under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, an authorized agent who 
signs a corporate check will not be 
personally liable if he (1) names his prin-
cipal and (2) demonstrates his agency 
relationship. If the signer completes only 
one of the requirements, he will be per-
sonally liable unless the holder of the 
instrument is the original payee and the 
signer can produce parol evidence 
which shows that the intent of the par-
ties was to bind only the corporation. 
Thus, 70A-3-403 gives the corporate 
agent the mechanism to insulate himself 
from personal liability on a dishonored 
negotiable instrument. 
13See, e.g., Trenton Trust Co. v. Klausman, 222 
Pa. Super. 400, 296 A.2d 275 (1972). 
14See Phoenix Air Conditioning Co. v. Pound, 
123 Ga. App. 523, 181 S.E.2d 719 (1971). 
II. The Bad-Check Remedy Statute 
and its Impact on the 
Uniform Commercial Code 
The original bad check law contained 
in UTAH CODE ANN. §7-15 (1953) pre-
sumed an intent to defraud when a 
check was dishonored. The presumption 
of fraud could be overcome by showing 
that the check was intended to clear. In 
1979 the section was amended.15 The 
new section removed the issue of fraud 
and placed absolute liability on the 
issuer of a dishonored check as well as 
the signing agent. The 1981 amend-
ment16 of UTAH CODE ANN. §7-15-1 
(1981)17 (hereinafter "7-15-1") is very 
similar to the 1979 version. 7-15-1(1) 
provides: 
Any person who makes, draws, signs 
or issues any check, draft, order, or 
other instrument upon any depository 
institution, whether as corporate 
agent or otherwise, for the purpose of 
obtaining from any person, firm, part-
nership or corporation any money, 
merchandise, property or other thing 
of value or paying for any service, 
151979 Utah Laws ch. 92 §1. 
161981 Utah Laws ch. 16 §1. 
17UTAH CODE ANN. §7-15-1 (1981) provides: 
(1) Any person who makes, draws, signs or 
issues any check, draft, order, or other instrument 
upon any depository institution, whether as corpo-
rate agent or otherwise, for the purpose of obtain-
ing from any person, firm, partnership or corpora-
tion any money, merchandise, property or other 
thing of value or paying for any service, wages, 
salary or rent, which check, draft, order, or other 
instrument is not honored upon presentment and 
is marked "refer to maker" or the account with the 
depository upon which the check, draft, order, or 
other instrument has been made or drawn, does 
not exist, has been closed or does not have suffi-
cient funds or sufficient credit with such depository 
for payment of the check, draft, or other instrument 
in full, shall be liable to the holder thereof. 
(2) The holder of the check, draft, order, or other 
instrument which has been dishonored may give 
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wages, salary or rent, which check, 
draft, order, or other instrument is not 
honored upon presentment and is 
marked "refer to maker" or the 
account with the depository upon 
which the check, draft, order, or other 
instrument has been made or drawn, 
does not exist, has been closed or 
does not have sufficient funds or 
sufficient credit with such depository 
for payment of the check, draft, or 
other instrument in full, shall be liable 
to the holder thereof. (Emphasis 
added). 
The purpose of 7-15-1 is to protect 
the holder of a dishonored check. It im-
poses personal liability on any person 
who signs a dishonored check, including 
the authorized agent who properly signs 
a corporate check by naming the cor-
poration represented and disclosing the 
agency relationship. In the case of a 
corporate check, the holder may seek 
recovery from both the corporation and 
the agent who signed the instrument. 
Prior to filing an action to collect on an 
instrument, the holder is required to give 
"written notice of intent to file civil ac-
written or verbal notice thereof to the person mak-
ing, drawing, signing, or issuing the check, draft, 
order, or other instrument and may imoose a ser-
vice charge not to exceed $5 in addition to any 
contractual agreement between the parties. Prior 
to filing an action based upon this section, the 
holder of a dishonored check, draft, order, or other 
instrument shall give the person making, drawing, 
signing, or issuing the dishonored check, draft, 
order, or other instrument written notice of intent to 
file civil action, allowing the person seven days 
from the date on which the notice was mailed to 
tender payment in full, plus a service charge is 
imposed for the dishonored check, draft, order, or 
other instrument. 
(3) In a civil action the person making, drawing, 
signing or issuing the check, draft order, or other 
instrument shall be liable to the holder of it for the 
amount thereon, for interest and all costs of collec-
tion, including all court costs and reasonable attor-
ney's fees. 
tion, allowing the person seven days... 
to tender payment in full."18 This gives 
the drawer the opportunity to pay the 
dishonored check before costly litigation 
is commenced. 
The scope and purposes of 70A-3-
403 (Uniform Commercial Code) and 7-
15-1 (Bad-Check Remedy Statute) are 
distinct; 70A-3-403, when properly fol-
lowed, insulates the authorized agent 
from personal liability on a dishonored 
corporate instrument, while 7-15-1 pro-
tects the holder of a dishonored check. 
Yet, the two statutes overlap because 
7-15-1 imposes absolute personal liabil-
ity on any person who signs a dishon-
ored check, including the corporate 
agent who complies with the 70A-3-403 
non-liability requirements of naming the 
principal and demonstrating the agency 
relationship. 
The burden of collecting a dishonored 
corporate check is shifted by 7-15-1 
from the holder to the signing agent. 
The agent is not a party to the business 
transaction; his role is to sign the corpo-
rate check because the corporation is 
unable to do so. Thus, the agent re-
ceives no direct personal benefit from 
the transaction. On the other hand, the 
holder receives a benefit from the busi-
ness transaction. For example, the hol-
der may be a businessman who extends 
credit to the corporation for goods sold, 
a craftsman who performs services for 
pay, or an employee. The holder who is 
not an original payee bargains with the 
payee in an arms length transaction 
when he accepts the check.19 Since the 
agent is not a party to the business 
18UTAH CODE ANN. §7-15-1(2) (1981). 
19Also, 70A-3-403 provides more protection to 
the hoider who is a third party transferee than the 
holder who is an original payee. An agent may use 
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transaction and does not receive any 
direct benefit from the transaction it is 
inequitable to force the agent to collect 
the bad check for the holder. 
It may be argued that an agent who 
signs a corporate check is or should be 
aware of the status of the corporate 
account when the check is drawn. But 
courts have refused to impute know-
ledge of the status of the corporate 
account to an agent simply because of 
the agent's position as a corporate 
officer.20 Even if this knowledge is im-
puted to the corporate officer, it is debat-
able whether the same standard of 
knowledge should be imposed on a 
salaried clerk, secretary, or other agent 
who has no control over the corporate 
account or knowledge of its status. 
III. Conclusion 
Although 7-15-1 zealously protects 
holders of dishonored negotiable instru-
paro! evidence to avoid personal liability on a dis-
honored negotiable instrument only if (1) he com-
plies with at least one of the non-liability require-
ments (name the corporation and show the agency 
relationship) and (2) the holder is the original 
payee. Thus, an agent will be personally liable on 
a dishonored negotiable instrument to a third party 
transferee unless the agent complies completely 
with 70A-3-403. 
^Highfield v. Lang, 394 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. App. 
1979). 
ments, it is too broad in its scope be-
cause it encroaches upon established 
principles of commercial and agency 
law. The burden of collecting a dishon-
ored check is shifted by 7-15-1 from the 
holder who is a party to the business 
transaction and receives the benefit of 
the transaction to the corporate agent 
who may have little or no control over 
corporate affairs and receives no per-
sonal benefit from the transaction. 
The rights of all parties could be more 
equitably protected if 7-15-1 incorpo-
rated the principles of agency liability as 
set out in 70A-3-403. The statutes could 
be harmonized by changing 7-15-1 to 
require a rebuttable presumption of 
fraud in lieu of imposing absolute liability 
on the authorized agent who signs a 
negotiable instrument on behalf of the 
principal. This will protect the authorized 
agent who, in the course of his or her 
duties, is required to sign a negotiable 
instrument which is subsequently dis-
honored. The holder will still receive 
adequate protection because he can 
look to the corporation and the agent if 
the agent does not rebut the presump-
tion of fraud or fails to comply with the 
70A-3-403 non-liability requirements set 
out in subsection I of this article. This 
alternative will equitably balance the in-
terests of the agent and holder. 
Grant us grace fearlessly to contend against evil and to make no peace 
with oppression; and, that we may reverently use our freedom, help us to 
employ it in the maintenance of justice among men and nations. 
— Book of Common Prayer 
ROBERT H. WILDEf USB # 3466 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
COOK & WILDEf P.C. 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 255-6000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHNNY HAIGr 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ORRICE McSHANE, 
Defendant, 
ORRICE McSHANE, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RONALD DAVEY, 
Third Party Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly before the Court on the 
21st day of March, 1986 at the hour of 2:00 p.m., the 
Honorable Scott Daniels presiding. Plaintiff was 
represented by Robert H. Wilde; Defendant was represented 
by J. Ray Barrios. The parties had previously submitted 
memoranda on the issues raised in the Motion before the 
Court which memoranda had been reviewed by the Court. The 
Court heard argument from counsel, and, being fully 
-1-
MrVv o 1200 
ORDER OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
3Z/t> 
Civil No. C85-8070 
Judge Scott Daniels 
advised in the premises, ruled that the statute in 
consideration, Utah Code Annotated §7-15-1 (1953, as 
amended) is a strict liability statute, and that even if 
the Defendant, or another party, had advised the Plaintiff 
that there were not sufficient funds to allow the check to 
clear at the time the check was provided to the Plaintiff, 
the provisions of the statute establish the liability of 
the Defendant. Court being fully advised in the premises 
and good cause appearing therefore, 
NOW THEREFORE it is hereby ordered that the Plaintiff 
is awarded summary judgment against the Defendant in the 
principal amount of $10,563.49, with interest thereon of 
$3,433.13, and attorney's fees of $770.00. 
DATED this ^ day of Af) * I 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
£jCtu$ 
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS 
District Court Judge 
MAILED, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing 
Order for Summary Judgment to J. Ray Barrios, Attorney for 
Defendant, 136 East South Temple, Suite 900, University 
Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this JPUf* day 
of yVhnch f 1986. 
rrML0on^fcfo+i77<yrfI> 
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ADDENDUM 4 
7-14-4 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
or credit reporting agency the following: (1) that an account maintained 
to effect third party payment transactions has been closed out by the insti-
tution, the reasons therefor, and the identity of the depositor or account 
holder; (2) upon the request of another financial institution any other 
information in the files of the institution relating to the credit experience 
of the reporting institution with respect to a particular person as to whom 
inquiry is made; and (3) any information concerning attempted or potential 
activity to defraud a financial institution or to obtain funds from a finan-
cial institution by fraudulent or other unlawful means or other informa-
tion relating to individuals sought by law enforcement authorities for 
alleged violations of criminal laws. 
History: C. 1953, 7-14-3, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 16, § 12. 
7-14-4. Immunity from liability. No depository institution making any 
report or communication of information authorized by this chapter shall 
be liable to any person for disclosing such information to any recipient 
authorized to receive this information under this chapter, or for any error 
or omission in such report or communication. 
History: C. 1953, 7-14-4, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 16, § 12. 
7-14-5. Reciprocal exchange of information authorized. One or more 
financial institutions may jointly agree with one or more other financial 
institutions for the reciprocal exchange of any information authorized to 
be reported by the provisions of this chapter. Such reciprocal exchange of 
information or the acts or refusals to act of one or more recipients because 
of such information shall not constitute a boycott or blacklist, or otherwise 
be a basis for liability to any person on the part of any participant in the 
reciprocal exchange of information authorized by this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 7-14-5, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 16, § 12. 
CHAPTER 15 
FRAUDULENT CHECKS 
Section 
7-15-1. Civil liability of issuer — Notice. 
7-15-2. Notice form. 
7-15-1. Civil liability of issuer — Notice. (1) Any person who makes, 
draws, signs or issues any check, draft, order, or other instrument upon 
any depository institution, whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for 
the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership or corporation 
any money, merchandise, property or other thing of value or paying for 
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any service, wages, salary or rent, which check, draft, order, or other 
instrument is not honored upon presentment and is marked "refer to 
maker" or the account with the depository upon which the check, draft, 
order, or other instrument has been made or drawn, does not exist, has 
been closed or does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit with such 
depository for payment of the check, draft, or other instrument in full, 
shall be liable to the holder thereof. 
(2) The holder of the check, draft, order, or other instrument which has 
been dishonored may give written or verbal notice thereof to the person 
making, drawing, signing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other 
instrument and may impose a service charge not to exceed $5 in addition 
to any contractual agreement between the parties. Prior to filing an action 
based upon this section, the holder of a dishonored check, draft, order, or 
other instrument shall give the person making, drawing, signing, or issuing 
the dishonored check, draft, order, or other instrument written notice of 
intent to file civil action, allowing the person seven days from the date on 
which the notice was mailed to tender payment in full, plus a service 
charge is imposed for the dishonored check, draft, order, or other instru-
ment. 
(3) In a civil action the person making, drawing, signing or issuing the 
check, draft, order, or other instrument shall be liable to the holder of it 
for the amount thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including 
all court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
History: C. 1953, 7-15-1, enacted by L. Collateral References. 
1981, ch. 16, § 13.
 1 0 C J S B i U s a n d N o t e s §§ 35^  m 
Compiler's Notes. 12 AmJur 2d 147, Bills and Notes § 1119. 
Laws 1981, ch. 16, §1 repealed old sections Necessity of pleading that maker or 
7-15-1. 7-15-3 (L. 1969, ch. 240, §§ 1, 3; 1977, drawer of check was given notice of its dis-
ch. 15, §§ 1, 3; 1979, ch. 92, §§ 1, 2), relating to honor by bank, 6 ALR 2d 985. 
fraudulent checks. New sections 7-15-1 and Personal liability of officers or directors of 
7-1D-2 were enacted by §13 of the act.
 c o r p o r a t i o n o n corporate checks issued 
Fn°.rome[ SnoCtl*°? " l 0"2 WaS r e p e a k d b y U W S against insufficient funds, 47 ALR 3d 1250. 1979, en. 92, 9 3. 
Cross-References. L a w Reviews. 
Criminal penalties for issuing bad check, Criminal and Civil Liability for Bad 
76-6-505. Checks in Utah, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 122.. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Fraud. account, plaintiff accepted it with knowledge 
There was no fraudulent issuance of a that there were insufficient funds to cover it 
check, and plaintiff was not entitled to attor- and agreed to hold it for two weeks before 
ney fees in an action on the check, where the presenting it to the bank. Howells, Inc. v. 
check was issued to pay on a past due Nelson (1977) 565 P 2d 1147. 
7-15-2. Notice form. (1) "Notice" means notice given to the person 
making, drawing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other instrument 
either in person or in writing. Such notice, in writing, shall be conclusively 
presumed to have been given when properly deposited in the United States 
mails, postage prepaid, by certified or registered mail, return receipt 
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requested, and addressed to such signer at his address as it appears on 
the-check, draft, order, or other instrument or at his last-known address. 
(2) Written notice as applied in subsection 7-15-1 (2) shall take the fol-
lowing form: 
Date: 
To: You are hereby notified that check(s) described below 
issued by you has been returned to us unpaid: 
Instrument date: 
Instrument number 
Originating institution: 
Amount 
Reason for dishonor (marked on instrument): 
The foregoing instrument together with a service charge of $5 must be 
paid to the undersigned within seven days from the date of this notice in 
accordance with section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, or appropriate 
civil legal action may be filed against you for the amount due and owing 
together with service charges, interest, court costs, and attorney's fees as 
provided by law. 
In addition, the criminal code provides in section 76-6-505, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953: Any person who issues or passes a check for the payment 
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, 
or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for 
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by 
the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a 
bad check. The foregoing civil action does not preclude the right to prose-
cute under the criminal code of the State of Utah. 
(Signed) 
Name of Holder: 
Address of Holder:_ 
Telephone Number. 
History: C. 1953, 7-15-2, enacted by L. cumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of 
1981, ch. 16, § 13. this act shall not be affected thereby." 
Separability Clause. 
Section 14 of Laws 1981, ch. 16 provided: 
"If any provision of this act, or the applica- Section 16 of Laws 1981, ch. 16 provided: 
Effective Date. 
ti    
tion of any provision to any person or cir- "This act shall take effect on July 1,1981 
CHAPTER 16 
CONSUMER FUNDS TRANSFER FACILITIES ACT 
Section 
7-16-1. Legislative findings and purpose of act — Short title. 
7-16-2. Definitions. 
7-16-3. Application of act — Restrictions on use of facilities. 
7-16-4. Consumer funds transfer facilities board created — Members — Appointment — 
Terms — Vacancies — Disclosure statement — Per diem allowance and travel 
expenses — Executive secretary — Staff. 
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